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**TOP SECRET**

**SENSITIVE**

13 March 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)**

**From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale**

**Subject: Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose**

As desired by General Taylor on 12 March, the planning for Operation Mongoose is now prepared on a format of separate planning for each Department and Agency involved. Revised planning along this line is submitted herewith.

Activities already approved are marked with an asterisk. Further planning must await determination of policy questions raised in my 12 March 1962 memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented).

Planning transmitted to you by my memorandum of 10 March 1962 should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security.

**Attachments**

**Distribution:**

**Copy: To:**

- 1 - General Taylor
- 2 - The Attorney General
- 3 - Secretary Rusk/Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
- 4 - Secretary McNamara/Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
- 5 - General Lemnitzer (through General Craig)
- 6/7 - Mr. McCone (through Mr. Helms/Mr. Harvey)
- 8 - Mr. Murrow/Mr. Wilson
- 9/10 - Chief of Operations

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by N. Moran, National Security Council

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Copy No. 3 of 10 copies. Series A.

SENSITIVE

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OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE I (CIA)

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**UNCLASSIFIED**  
1 - 15 March 1962

*DR*

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

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\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

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(cont)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
4. * Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.	To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.	This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)
5. * Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.	To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.	As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)

#### OTHER OPERATIONS

#### INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

7. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

16 - 31 March 1962

One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

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<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
8.		
9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.	To ready agent operations.	Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.
10. * Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U. S.	To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U. S. citizens) now in the United States.	There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other U. S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)
11. * Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.	To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U. S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.	As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

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REF ID: A6511001

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
<b>INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS</b>		

12. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. To collect intelligence. Number of agents undetermined as yet.

13. [REDACTED]

**OTHER OPERATIONS**

None.

16 - 30 April 1962

**INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS**

14. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. To collect intelligence. Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.

15. [REDACTED]

**OTHER OPERATIONS**

None.

1 - 15 May 1962

**INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS**

16. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. To collect intelligence. Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.

17. [REDACTED]

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<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
18.		
19.		
<u>OTHER OPERATIONS</u>		
None.		
<u>16 - 31 May 1962</u>		
<u>INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.</u>		
20. * Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can.
21. One possible singleton agent operation, Isle of Pines.	To collect intelligence.	Difficult
22.		

23. Five "legal travel" agents inside Cuba.

24. By 31 May, selection of 50 additional agents and train 35 additional agents.

\* Items marked by an asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

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<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
<b>OTHER OPERATIONS</b>		

25. [REDACTED] To debase the economy of Cuba.

[REDACTED]

1 June - 31 July 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

26. \* 10 to 15 teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. To collect intelligence.

Number of agents in each team and selection of areas will be determined by developments of the previous actions and by conditions.

27. Reinforce and resupply agents and teams previously placed or activated inside Cuba. To reinforce and resupply, as possible.

Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery).

28. By 31 July, select 100 additional agents and train 70 additional agents. To ready agent operations.

29. [REDACTED]

30. \* Survey airfields, military installations, and communication centers. To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime.

This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents.

31. [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//COMINT//  
1 June (cont)


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<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
<u>OTHER OPERATIONS</u>		
None.		

32. \* Comprehensive and definitive intelligence report on attitudes and abilities of the population in Cuba.

To provide the Special Group (IISG 5412 augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation.

End of July 1962



\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

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